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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The role of business enterprises in the international legal order and the concept of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) have received renewed attention over the last decade.
1
 CSR has been discussed 
within the framework of international organizations and forums – such as the Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
2
 the International Labor Organization (ILO),
3
 the 
World Bank,
4
 the United Nations (UN),
5
 the European Union (EU),
6
 and the G8
7
 – as well as within 
national states. 
                                                          
1
 For initiatives undertaken in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, see, for example, S. Joseph, The Human Rights 
Accountability of MNEs, in: M.T. Kamminga, S. Zia-Zarifi (Eds.), Liability of Multinational Corporations under 
International Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, pp. 83-85; P. Muchlinski, Corporations in 
International Law, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, at <www.mpepil.com>, para. 16. 
2
 The OECD has dealt with CSR since the early 1970s and has facilitated, among other things, the drafting, 
updating and implementation of the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of the Organization of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD Guidelines); Recommendations for Responsible Business Conduct in a 
Global Context, Adopted by the 42 adhering governments at the OECD’s 50
th
 Anniversary Ministerial Meeting 
of 25 May 2011, as annex to the OECD Declaration on Decisions on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises. Through <www.oecd.org>. Muchlinski quotes the OECD Guidelines ‘General Policies’ (which 
currently list 15 responsibilities of multinational enterprises) in order to define the term ‘International 
Corporate Social Responsibility’. The General Policies make clear, according to Muchlinski, that social 
responsibility has economic, social and ethical dimensions. P. Muchlinski, Corporate Social Responsibility, in: P. 
Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 643-645. 
3
 The ILO has dealt with CSR since the late 1970s and has facilitated, among other things, the drafting and 
updating of the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 
(Tripartite Declaration), adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 204
th
 Session 
(Geneva, November 1977), as amended at its 279
th
 (November 2000) and 295
th
 Session (March 2006). Through 
<www.ilo.org>. 
4
 The World Bank Group has dealt with CSR, among other ways, through the International Finance Corporate 
(IFC), which uses the Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability (IFC Performance 
Standards), 30 April 2006. Through <www.ifc.org>. 
5
 Within the United Nations framework, the human rights commission and the United Nations Commission on 
Transnational Corporations – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1970s till the early 1990s) 
dealt with CSR related issues. In 2000, the United Nations Global Compact was established by the United 
Nations and the business community to provide a ‘policy framework for organizing and developing corporate 
sustainability strategies while offering a platform – based on universal principles – to encourage innovative 
initiatives and partnerships with civil society, governments and other stakeholders.” Its establishment was 
instigated by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 31 January 1999 
(SG/SM/6881 of 1 February 1999). Over 8700 corporations and other stakeholders from over 130 countries 
have adhered to it. See <www.unglobalcompact.org>. See also Business & Human Rights Initiative, How to Do 
Business with Respect for Human Rights: A Guidance Tool for Companies, Global Compact Network 
Netherlands, The Hague, 2010. 
6
 The EU has dealt with CSR at various levels since 2001. On 25 October 2011, the European Commission sent 
its most recent ‘Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
6 
 
In 2005 the UN Human Rights Commission, which is the predecessor of the current Human Rights 
Council, requested the Secretary-General in 2005 ‘to appoint a special representative on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’. His mandate was, 
among other things, ‘[t]o identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability 
for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights’.
8
 
Following his appointment as special representative on 25 July 2005, John Ruggie presented a 
‘conceptual and policy framework to anchor the business and human rights debate, and to help 
guide all relevant actors’ on 7 April 2008.
9
 This Framework for Business and Human Rights 
(Framework) consists of three pillars: (1) the duty of states to protect human rights; (2) the 
responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights; and (3) access to remedies for those 
affected by human rights violations.
10
 This framework currently appears to be the dominant 
paradigm for discussing CSR.
11
 
The first pillar focuses on the duty of states to protect people against human rights abuses.
 12
 This 
obligation follows from the general obligation of states to observe human rights obligations within 
their territories,
13
 following from their obligations under customary international as well as under 
relevant and applicable treaty law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A renewed strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
COM(2011) 681 final.’ See also the non-governmental European Alliance for CSR and CSR Europe at 
<www.csreurope.org>. 
7
 See for example, G8 Summit 2007 Heiligendamm, Growth and responsibility in the world economy; Summit 
Declaration (7 June 2007), paras. 9, 24-26, 84-85, 96. 
8
 E/CN.4/2005/69 of 20 April 2005; Resolution of the Commission on Human Rights on Human Rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, para. 1. 
9
 A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie; Promotion and Protection of 
All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development; 
Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, p. 1. 
10
 The foundation of this framework was established by the special representative’s 2007 reports A/HRC/4/35, 
19 February 2007; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie; Business and human rights: 
mapping international standards of responsibility and accountability for corporate acts; A/HRC/4/35/Add.1, 13 
February 2007; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie; Addendum: State responsibilities to 
regulate and adjudicate corporate activities under the United Nations core human rights treaties: an overview 
of treaty body commentaries; A/HRC/4/35/Add.2, 15 February 2007; Report of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie; Addendum: Corporate responsibility under international law and issues in 
extraterritorial regulation: summary of legal workshops.  
11
 See, for example, the references provided by Backer: L.C. Backer, The United Nations’ “Protect-Respect-
Remedy” Project: Operationalizing a Global Human Rights Based Framework for the Regulation of 
Transnational Corporations, Conference Paper, Symposium: Corporations and International Law, Santa Clara 
Law, 2010, through: <law.scu.edu>, pp. 4-5. 
12
 This duty is additional to the duty of states to respect, promote and fulfill human rights. See A/HRC/4/35, 19 
February 2007; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie; Business and human rights: mapping 
international standards of responsibility and accountability for corporate acts, p. 5, fn 6. 
13
 A/HRC/8/5, paras. 18. On the extra-territorial application of human rights obligations, in particular the duty 
to protect people from human rights abuses, see A/HRC/4/35, para. 15. See, for example, the scope of the 
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The second pillar focuses on the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights,
14
 
which, according to the Special Representative, means ‘not to infringe on the rights of others – put 
simply, to do no harm’.
15
 Business enterprises must show due diligence,
16
 which is ‘a process 
whereby companies not only ensure compliance with national law but also manage the risk of human 
rights harm with a view to avoiding it.’
17
 The substantive scope of the responsibility of business 
enterprises appears to be unlimited, because ‘there are few if any internationally recognized rights 
business cannot impact’.
18
 The formal scope of the responsibility to respect is limited to a company’s 
sphere of influence, which ‘depends on the potential and actual human rights impacts resulting from 
a company’s business activities and the relationships connected to those activities.’
19
 If companies 
fail to observe this responsibility, they can be subjected to the ‘courts of public opinion (…) and 
occasionally to charges in actual courts.’
20
 Although this responsibility to respect exists ‘over and 
above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human rights’
21
 and appears to be 
primarily a moral responsibility rather than a legal requirement, non-compliance may nevertheless 
have legal consequences.
22
 
The third pillar focuses on access to remedies for those who have been harmed by human rights 
violations. This pillar follows from the state duty to protect against human rights abuses and from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR), which are limited to the territory and jurisdiction of states parties (Article 2 ICCPR) respectively the 
jurisdiction of the states parties (Article 1 ECHR). See also, in this context, the recent Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 28 September 2011, 
through <www.maastrichtuniversity.nl>. Generally on extraterritorial application of human rights treaties: F. 
Coomans, M.T. Kamminga (Eds.), Extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp, 
2004.  
14
 A/HRC/8/5, para. 23. See also A/HRC/4/35, paras. 45-62. The Special Representative did not find sufficient 
evidence for the existence of responsibility of corporations under customary international law nor under treaty 
law (A/HRC/4/35, paras. 34-44). 
15
 A/HRC/8/5, para. 24. 
16
 According to the Special Representative, the scope of their due diligence depends on the rights involved and 
requires an integrated human rights policy, impact assessments and monitoring and auditing to track 
performance. A/HRC/8/5, paras. 56-64. 
17
 A/HRC/8/5, para. 25. 
18
 A/HRC/8/5, para. 52. For an overview of the potential human rights impact of transnational corporations, see 
A/HRC/8/5/Add.2, 23 May 2008; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie; Promotion and 
Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development; Addendum; Corporations and human rights: a survey of the scope and patterns of alleged 
corporate-related human rights abuse, paras. 18 (labor rights impacted) and 23 (non-labor rights impacted). 
19
 A/HRC/8/5, para. 72. 
20
 A/HRC/8/5, para. 54. 
21
 A/HRC/17/31, commentary to principle 11.  
22
 The possibilities and difficulties to instigate civil proceedings in the Netherlands were discussed by Van Dam 
in 2008, Castermans / Van der Weide in 2009, and Eijsbouts in 2010: A.G. Castermans, J.A. van der Weide, De 
juridische verantwoordelijkheid van Nederlandse moederbedrijven voor de betrokkenheid van dochters bij 
schending van fundamentele, internationaal erkende rechten, Leiden, 2009, TK 26 485, Nr. 81, Vergaderjaar 
2009-2010; Bijlage bij brief van de Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken van 18 december 2009; A.J.A.J. 
Eijsbouts, Elementaire beginselen van Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemerschap, in: Maatschappelijk 
verantwoord ondernemen , Preadviezen van A.J.A.J. Eijsbouts, F.G.H. Kristen, J.M. de Jongh, A.J.P. Schild, L. 
Timmerman, Handelingen Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging, 140
e
 jaargang / 2010-I, Kluwer, Deventer, 2010; C. 
van Dam, Onderneming en mensenrechten; Zorgvuldigheidsnormen voor ondernemingen ter voorkoming van 
betrokkenheid bij schending van mensenrechten, Boom Juridische uitgevers, Den Haag, 2008. 
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business enterprises’ responsibility to respect human rights and requires the establishment of 
effective grievance mechanisms, both by states and business enterprises.
23
 
According to the Special Representative, this three-pillar framework provides a coherent approach 
towards reducing the adverse human rights impact of transnational business operations. Because the 
Framework emphasizes the individual responsibilities of various stakeholders, in particular states and 
business enterprises, it aims to reduce the governance gaps, which are ‘at the roots of the business 
and human rights predicament’.
24
 
The Human Rights Council welcomed this Framework on 18 June 2008 and decided to extend the 
Special Representative’s mandate to operationalize it.
25
 Ruggie subsequently presented his Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles),
26
 on 21 March 2011, which were 
welcomed and endorsed by the Human Rights Council on 16 June 2011.
27
 
1.2 Corporate Social Responsibility and Labor Standards 
Although the Framework and complementary Guiding Principles are both related to ‘Business and 
Human Rights’, the responsibilities of states and business enterprises are extended to international 
labor standards.
28
 This follows from Guiding Principle 12, which provides: ‘The responsibility of 
business enterprises to respect human rights [as laid down in Guiding Principle 11] refers to 
                                                          
23
 A/HRC/8/5, paras. 26 and 82. 
24
 A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, para. 17. 
25
 A/HRC/RES/8/7 of 18 June 2008; Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. 
26
 A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie; Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework. ‘ The 
Guiding Principles are grounded in recognition of: (a) States’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfill 
human rights and fundamental freedoms; (b) The role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society 
performing specialized functions, required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights; (c) 
The need for rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached.’ 
(General Principles). 
27
 A/HRC/RES/17/4 of 16 June 2011; Human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, para. 1. For a discussion of the historical development of the Framework, see: L.C. Backer, The 
United Nations’ “Protect-Respect-Remedy” Project: Operationalizing a Global Human Rights Based Framework 
for the Regulation of Transnational Corporations, Conference Paper, Symposium: Corporations and 
International Law, Santa Clara Law, 2010, through: <law.scu.edu>. 
28
 This responsibility of business enterprises to observe labor standards must be distinguished from the 
responsibility of business enterprises to create employment opportunities in host countries (see for example 
OECD Guidelines, General Policies, para A.4) and employ local community members (as identified in the draft 
General Memorandum of Understanding between Chevron Nigeria Limited and local communities (as 
represented by the Regional Development Council) and the State Government, on file with the author, and to 
be discussed further below. Similarly, this responsibility must be distinguished from the responsibilities 
undertaken by business leaders, among others, under the South African Peace Accord of September 1991, to 
curb politicized ethnic violence in South African townships. One of the conflict interventions was 
(unsuccessfully because of the model chosen) carried out by labor mediators from the Independent Mediation 
Service of South Africa. See D. Bremner, South African Experiences with Identity and Community Conflicts, 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38/3, 2001. 
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internationally recognized human rights – understood, at a minimum,
29
 as those expressed in the 
International Bill of Human Rights
30
 and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the 
International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ 
(emphasis added).
31
 
The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of the ILO was adopted in 1998 and 
identifies four core labor standards.
32
 These four principles concerning fundamental rights are: 
a. The freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
b. The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; 
c. The effective abolition of child labor; and 
d. The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
The existence of the responsibility of business enterprises to respect these four fundamental labor 
standards is confirmed by, among other instruments, the ILO Tripartite Declaration,
33
 the OECD 
Guidelines
34
 and the IFC Performance Standards.
35
 While the voluntary nature of the responsibility of 
business enterprises in relation to these standards is stressed in both the Tripartite Declaration and 
the OECD Guidelines,
36
 the responsibility of business enterprises (as lenders from the IFC) to observe 
the above-mentioned standards is obligatory under the IFC Performance Standards. 
While states have a general duty to protect human rights, pursuant to Guiding Principle 1,
37
 their 
duty to respect the above-mentioned four fundamental labor standards follows – for the majority of 
                                                          
29
 Other labor standards which are sometimes mentioned in CSR context are adequate housing (as part of 
employment arrangements) and occupational health and safety standards. See P. Muchlinski, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, in: P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 646-654. See, also, for example, Human Rights Watch, Ripe 
with Abuse; Human Rights Conditions in South Africa’s Fruit and Wine Industry, New York, NY, 2011, which 
includes an overview of ‘better practices on farms in South Africa (pp. 88-89). 
30
 The International Bill of Rights consists of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 
ICCPR and the 1966 International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
31
 A/HRC/17/31, principle 12. 
32
 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, Adopted by the 
International Labour Conference at its Eighty-sixth Session, Geneva, 18 June 1998, para. 2. In 2008, the 
International Labor Conference recognized the implementation of the four fundamental principles and rights at 
work as one of its four strategic objectives ‘ through which the Decent Work Agenda is expressed’ in its 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (para. A.iv). 
33
 ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, Adopted by 
the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 204
th
 Session (Geneva, November 1977), as 
amended at its 279
th
 (November 2000) and 295
th
 Session (March 2006), paras. 22, 36, 42, 44, 49, 51-55. 
34
 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; Recommendations for Responsible Business Conduct in a 
Global Context, Adopted by the 42 adhering governments at the OECD’s 50
th
 Anniversary Ministerial Meeting 
of 25 May 2011, as annex to the OECD Declaration on Decisions on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises, Chapter IV.  
35
 Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability of the International Finance Corporation, 
30 April 2006, paras. 9-11, 14-15. 
36
 Addendum II to the Tripartite Declaration stresses the ‘voluntary character or the meaning of the provisions’ 
of the Tripartite Declaration. This is echoed in para. I.1 of the OECD Guidelines which provides: ‘Observance of 
the Guidelines by enterprises is voluntary and not legally enforceable.’  
37
 Guiding Principle 1 provides: ‘States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, 
investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulation and adjudication.’ 
10 
 
states – from their being party to the conventions which reflect these principles.
38
 Furthermore, the 
International Labor Conference
39
 submitted in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work that all states – even those who have not become party to these ILO Conventions – 
must uphold these standards, by virtue of their membership of the ILO.
40
 Furthermore, the four core 
labor standards also qualify as fundamental human rights
41
 which must be protected in any case 
pursuant to Guiding Principle 1. 
1.3 Corporate Social Responsibility and HUGO 
In view of the above-mentioned third pillar of the Framework and Guiding Principles – access to 
remedies – the World Legal Forum (WLF) and its partners in the Hague Utilities for Global 
Organizations (HUGO) program on CSR decided to establish a Conflict Management Center in the 
Hague. 
According to the HUGO partners, the need for this center was confirmed by a study from David 
Kovick and Caroline Rees carried out in 2010 within the framework of the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiative of the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University,
42
 and 
                                                          
38
 (1) The freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining: ILO 
Convention 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize of 1948 (150 
ratification); and ILO Convention 98 concerning the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining of 1949 (160 
ratifications). (2) The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor: ILO Convention 29 concerning 
Forced or Compulsory Labor of 1930 (175 ratifications); and ILO Convention 105 concerning the Abolition of 
Forced Labor of 1957 (169 ratifications). (3) The effective abolition of child labor: ILO Convention 182 
concerning the Worst Forms of Child Labor of 1999 (174 ratifications); and ILO Convention 138 concerning the 
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment of 1973 (161 ratifications). (4) The elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation (ILO Convention 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation of 1958 (169 ratifications); and ILO Convention 100 concerning Equal 
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value of 1951 (168 ratifications). Through 
<www.ilo.org/ilolex>. See also ILO Helpdesk Fact Sheet No. 4 – Fundamental Principles, at 
<www.ilo.org/empent/areas/business-helpdesk>. 
39
 The International Labor Conference is an organ of the ILO consisting of the representatives of all Member 
states. Article 2 and 3 ILO Constitution. 
40
 The International Labor Conference recalled in this Declaration that by joining the ILO, all Members have 
endorsed the principles and rights as set out in the ILO Constitution and the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, 
which ‘have been expressed and developed in the form of specific rights and obligations in Conventions 
recognized as fundamental both inside and outside the Organization.’ Subsequently, the International Labor 
Conference declared that ‘all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an 
obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to realize, 
in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which 
are the subject of those Conventions’. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its 
Follow-up, para. 2. 
41
 The four fundamental labor principles are also reflected in human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR (Articles 
3, 8, 22, 24), the ICESCR (Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 8), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. See also FAQ 15 at <www.unglobalcompact.org>. 
42
 D. Kovick, C. Rees, International Support for Effective Dispute Resolution Between Companies and Their 
Stakeholders: Assessing Needs, Interests, and Models, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper 
No. 63, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2011. The report was the 
result of interview-based research, which was a deliberate bottom-up approach. See also C. Rees, Grievance 
Mechanisms for Business and Human Rights: Strengths, Weaknesses and Gaps, Corporate Social Responsibility 
Initiative, Working Paper No. 40, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 
2008, with similar recommendations for the establishment of a global ombuds function for business and 
11 
 
highlighted in the report and recommendations following the CSR expert meeting on 14 June 2011 in 
The Hague.
43
 
It is further understood that the Center will primarily:
44
 
• Provide information on available non-judicial grievance mechanisms in relation to CSR. 
• Provide advice on appropriate non-judicial grievance mechanisms in case of an existing CSR 
dispute between a corporation and its stakeholders concerning abuse of human rights, 
environmental and labor standards. 
• Facilitate dispute resolution in relation to CSR, in particular in relation to community-
company grievances, by means of mediation.
45
 
1.4 Object and purpose report 
This report is intended to provide a (non-exhaustive) overview of existing grievance mechanisms in 
relation to labor standards within the framework of CSR. This overview is limited to grievance 
mechanisms which are non-judicial, non-state/governmental, and non-company-based. This means 
that neither the grievance mechanisms established within the context of the OECD
46
 and the ILO
47
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
human rights and to develop linked hubs for information and other resources on grievance mechanisms by 
global and academic institutions (recommendations 7 and 9). Rees refers to the fact that those companies who 
have committed to codes of conducts and accompanying grievance mechanisms are of good will leaving a large 
number of companies which have not committed to any form of grievance mechanism (p. 34). 
43
 HUGO Conflict Management Facility on CSR, Report and Recommendations following the CSR expert 
meeting, 14 June 2011, at the offices of Pels Rijcken & Drooglever Fortuijn. 
44
 This understanding follows from the Position Paper of 13 May 2011 on ‘The CSR Conflict Management 
Facility The Hague’; the documentation (outline, slides, report) in relation to the CSR expert meeting in the 
Hague on 14 June 2011; the undated NIAS-HUGO ‘Research Questions’ paper; and the ‘CSR Remedy Centre; 
Hub for CSR conflict remedies; A HUGO initiative’ slides of September 2011; and meetings with HUGO-partners 
staff. 
45
 Mediation is a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) by which a third party assists disputants to solve 
their dispute. Kovick and Rees defined the term mediation as a form of dispute resolution which includes ‘all 
forms of dialogue-based processes assisted by a neutral third-party, for all kinds of disputes, potentially at all 
stages of the relationship between businesses and affected stakeholders’ in their above-mentioned report of 
2011: D. Kovick, C. Rees, International Support for Effective Dispute Resolution Between Companies and Their 
Stakeholders: Assessing Needs, Interests, and Models, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Working Paper 
No. 63, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2011, p. 11. See also on 
the various forms of ADR: Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Rights-Compatible Grievance Mechanisms: 
A Guidance Tool for Companies and Their Stakeholders, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working 
Paper 41, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2008, pp. 11-12. The 
presumed cost-effectiveness of mediation had led to renewed interest both under international law (see for 
example S/2009/189, 8 April 2009, Report of the Secretary-General on enhancing mediation and its support 
activities; the report relates to pursue sustainable peace within states and within regions) and national law. In 
2007, a number of mediation and arbitration institutions founded the International Mediation Institute (IMI), 
which provides information and training on mediation and which facilitates mediation by providing online 
profiles of IMI certified mediators. IMI is internet-based with its main office in The Hague. See 
<www.imimediation.org>.  
46
 The Council of the OECD decided – in relation to the OECD Guidelines – that states adhering to the OECD 
Guidelines must establish National Contact Points to provide for a complaints procedure, among other things, 
relating to the implementation of the OECD Guidelines. See Decision of the Council on OECD Guidelines and 
Procedural Guidance, attached to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises, as amended on 25 May 2011. 
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nor the grievance mechanisms established within business enterprises will be included in this 
overview. 
This report is intended to be instrumental to the establishment of the Conflict Management Center in 
two ways: 
1. It identifies existing grievance mechanisms in relation to labor disputes to which 
complainants may be referred to. 
2. It identifies institutions and organizations with which the Conflict Management Center may 
cooperate. 
Both aspects underlie Chapter 2 of this report and result in a number of recommendations in Chapter 
3. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
47
 For example, the grievance mechanism provided under the ‘Procedure for the examination of disputes 
concerning the application of the Tripartite Declaration by means of interpretation of its Provisions, adopted by 
the Governing Body of the International Labour Office at its 232nd Session (Geneva, March 1986).’ Pursuant to 
this procedure governments, national and international organizations of employers and workers may request 
the ILO Committee of Multinational Enterprises (MNE Committee) to interpret the Tripartite Declaration ‘to 
resolve a disagreement on their meaning, arising from an actual situation, between parties to whom the 
Declaration is commended’ (para. 1 Procedure). The procedure is separate from the general dispute resolution 
procedure under the ILO Constitution (Articles 24-26) involving the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry. 
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2. Non-judicial grievance mechanisms 
in relation to labor standards 
2.1 Introduction 
Access to remedies for those affected by human rights abuse constitutes the third pillar of the above-
mentioned Framework and complementary Guiding Principles. It is intended to provide redress for 
individual victims and supplements the limited monitoring or verification capabilities of business 
enterprises or other stakeholders.
48
 Although the third pillar appears to be primarily aimed at states, 
which ‘must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
appropriate means, (…) those affected have access to effective remedy’ (Guiding Principle 25),
49
 the 
third pillar also entails responsibilities for other stakeholders. 
First, business enterprises should have in place policies and processes appropriate to their size and 
circumstances, including: ‘Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts 
they cause or to which they contribute’ (Guiding Principle 15(c), second pillar). This responsibility of 
business enterprises is subsequently elaborate in Guiding Principles 22 (second pillar) and 29 (third 
pillar). The former provides that business enterprises have an obligation ‘to provide for or cooperate 
in (…) remediation through legitimate processes.’ The latter provides that ‘business enterprises 
should establish or participate in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms
50
 for individuals 
                                                          
48
 N. Ascoly, I. Zeldenrust, Discussing key elements of monitoring and verification, SOMO, Amsterdam, 2001, 
through <somo.nl>, pp. 7-8. Similarly N. Ascoly, I. Zeldenrust, Considering Complaint Mechanisms: An 
Important Tool for Code Monitoring and Verification, SOMO, Paper, 2003, through <BASESwiki.org>, p. 1; N. 
Ascoly, J. Oldenziel, I. Zeldenrust, Overvie of Recent Development on Monitoring and Verification in the 
Garment and Sportswear Industry in Europe, SOMO, Amsterdam, 2001, through <somo.nl>, p. 40.  
49
 Guiding Principle 25 provides: ‘As part of their duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse, 
States must take appropriate steps to ensure, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate 
means, that when such abuses occur within their territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to 
effective remedy.’ In order to provide access to remedies, states must provide for state-based judicial and non-
judicial grievance mechanisms (Guiding Principles 26 and 27) and should additionally, ‘consider ways to 
facilitate access to effective non-State-based grievance mechanisms dealing with business-related human rights 
harms’ (Guiding Principle 28). 
50
 According to the recently published interpretative guide to the Guidelines, the term grievance mechanism is 
used here as ‘a term of art to cover a whole range of mechanisms that address complaints and disputes 
involving enterprises and their stakeholders.’ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights; An Interpretative Guide, Advance unedited version (November 2011), 
at <www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/Tools.aspx>, para. 12.3. See also on the differences in 
terminology between complaints, grievances, and disputes: Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Rights-
Compatible Grievance Mechanisms: A Guidance Tool for Companies and Their Stakeholders, Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper 41, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA, 2008, pp. 12-13. The report does not distinguish between the terms grievance and complaint, 
and the term grievance mechanism is used to cover all situations. The Office of the Compliance Advisor / 
Ombudsman (CAO) of the World Bank Group defines a ‘company-community grievance mechanism’ as ‘A 
locally based, formalized way to accept, assess, and resolve community complaints concerning the 
performance or behavior of a company, its contractors, or employees.’ Office of the Compliance Advisor / 
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and communities who may be adversely impacted’.
 51
 According to the Special Representative, 
business enterprises may provide for such grievance mechanism within the company (internal or 
company-based)
52
 or external, by means of third parties.
53
 
Second, ‘[i]ndustry, multi-stakeholder and other collaborative initiatives that are based on respect 
for human rights-related standards should ensure that effective grievance mechanisms are available’ 
(Guiding Principle 30). 
Business enterprises and other stakeholders have implemented this responsibility to provide for 
grievance mechanisms in various ways. This report intends to provide an (non-exhaustive) overview 
of the grievance mechanisms available for business enterprises and other stakeholders in relation to 
labor standards within the framework of CSR.
54
 Internal grievance mechanisms or grievance 
mechanisms established by states – even when they are non-judicial in character – have not been 
included. In that sense, this report has a different scope than earlier reports published by the Center 
for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), the World Bank, and the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiative of the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University.
55
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Ombudsman (CAO), Advisory Note: A Guide to Designing and Implementing Grievance Mechanisms for 
Development Projects, p. iv. 
51
 See also ILO Tripartite Declaration, para. 58; OECD Guidelines, Chapter IV.6; and the IFC Performance 
Standards, 2.13. The ILO Tripartite Declaration echoes the ILO Recommendation concerning the Examination of 
Grievances within the Undertaking with a View to Their Settlement, Adopted by the General Conference of the 
International Labour Organisation at its Fifty-first session, Geneva, 29 June 1967, in particular paras. 2, 3, 8. 
Recommendations are non-binding guidelines of the General Conference of the ILO decided upon with a two-
thirds majority pursuant to Article 19 ILO Constitution. Recommendations must be considered by the 
competent legislative authorities of each Member State. Member States must subsequently report, upon 
request of the ILO Governing Body, the position of the law and the national practice in regard to the matters 
dealt with in the Recommendation (Article 19(6) ILO Convention). 
52
 Company-based grievance mechanisms may involve the help of third parties and may include ‘hotlines for 
raising complaints, advisory services for complainants, or expert mediators.’ A/HRC/8/5, para. 94. 
53
 Such grievance mechanisms have the advantage that they would appear to be more impartial, since the 
company will not have to act as defendant and judge at the same time. A/HRC/8/5, para. 95. Zandvliet and 
Anderson appear to be of the opinion that companies should provide for both an internal and an external 
grievance mechanism, which they refer to as a ‘recourse mechanism’. According to Zandvliet and Anderson, 
‘[p]eople lodging a complaint need to have recourse if they are dissatisfied with the outcome of the 
investigation’. L. Zandvliet, M.B. Anderson, Getting it Right; Making Corporate – Community Relations Work, 
Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, 2009, p. 133. 
54
 Please note that the above-mentioned fundamental labor standards also qualify as human rights and any 
grievances in relation thereto would thus fall within the scope of general human rights grievance mechanisms. 
55
 N. Ascoly, I. Zeldenrust, Considering Complaint Mechanisms: An Important Tool for Code Monitoring and 
Verification, SOMO, Paper, 2003, through <BASESwiki.org>; The World Bank Group – Corporate Social 
Responsibility Practice, Company Codes of Conduct and International Standards: An Analytical Comparison, 
Part I and II, through www.worldbank.org>; Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Rights-Compatible 
Grievance Mechanisms: A Guidance Tool for Companies and Their Stakeholders, Corporate Social Responsibility 
Initiative, Working Paper 41, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 
2008; C. Rees, Overview of a Selection of Existing Accountability Mechanisms for Handling Complaints and 
Disputes, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper 37, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2007; C. Rees, Grievance Mechanisms for Business and Human Rights: 
Strengths, Weaknesses and Gaps, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 40, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2008; C. Rees, D. Vermijs, Mapping 
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The grievance mechanisms included in this (high-level) overview vary greatly in character. On the one 
hand, business enterprises have committed themselves to external grievance mechanisms as 
established by (multi-stakeholder) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (sections 2.2 and 2.3 
below distinguishing between mechanisms which are exclusively designed for labor disputes and 
those which are not). On the other hand, some business enterprises provide for external grievance 
mechanisms on the basis of ad hoc agreements (section 2.4 below). 
2.2 Labor-only grievance mechanisms 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Currently a number grievance mechanisms can be identified which are exclusively dedicated to 
solving labor-related disputes. Eight of these labor-only grievance mechanisms will be discussed in 
the subsequent paragraphs (section 2.2 – 2.9). These are the grievance mechanisms provided by: the 
Social Accountability International (SAI) and the Social Accountability Accreditation Services (SAAS) 
relating to the SA8000 standard, the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), the Business Social Compliance 
Initiative (BSCI), the Fair Labor Association (FLA), the Fear Wear Foundation (FWF), the Worker Rights 
Consortium (WRC), the Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), and the International Council of Toy Industries 
(ICTI). 
Three of these grievance mechanism are not-sector specific (SAI/SAAS, ETI, BSCI); four grievance 
mechanisms are focused on the textile industry (FLA, FWF, WRC, CCC); and one mechanism is 
focused in the toy manufacturing industry. The textile and toy manufacturing industry have in 
common that they are both labor intensive and make use of supply chains originating in low-wage 
states in particular in Asia. 
2.2.2 Social Accountability International / Social Accountability 
Accreditation Services complaint procedure 
The complaint procedure of Social Accountability International (SAI) and the Social Accountability 
Accreditation Services (SAAS) is related to the SAI’s SA8000 standard. SAI is a ‘non-governmental, 
multi-stakeholder organization whose mission is to advance the human rights of workers around the 
world’. It was established in the mid-1990s. The SA8000 standard is an auditable certification 
standard based on ‘international human rights norms and national labour laws that will protect and 
empower all personnel within a company’s scope of control and influence, who produce products or 
provide services for that company, including personnel employed by the company itself, as well as by 
its suppliers/subcontractors, sub-suppliers, and home workers. (…) Its requirements apply 
universally, regardless of a company’s size, geographic location, or industry sector.’
56
 
While SAI focuses on (local) capacity building (it provides compliance training and promotes social 
dialogue), SAAS is responsible for auditing and certification and provides for a complaint (as well as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Grievance Mechanisms in the Business and Human Rights Arena, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative 
Report No. 28, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2008. 
56
 At <www.sa-intl.org>. SAI has been a founding member of ISEAL Alliance. ISEAL Alliance was established in 
2002 by eight social and environmental certification organizations in order to collaborate and increase the 
effectiveness of these standards, increase peer review and represent common interests in international 
forums. See <www.isealalliance.org>. 
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an appeals) procedure in the so-called SAAS Global Procedures Guideline 304 which primarily 
provides guidance to bodies or persons wishing to submit a complaint.  
A complaint is defined as a ‘formal expression of dissatisfaction (…) by any organization or person, 
with some matter related to a certification body, a certified facility, or SAAS and its staff, where a 
response is expected’ (Article 2.1). The SAAS complaint procedure distinguishes between four types 
of complaints, including so-called ‘Type 3’ complaints, which may be ‘[r]eceived from interested 
parties about the performance of certified facilities’ (Article 3.4). These claims must be first lodged 
with the relevant certification body and then, if necessary, with SAAS.  
The complaints procedure provides for general guidance on making a complaint (Article 5). 
Complaints may be lodged anonymously, but must include contact information for follow-up. 
Complaints must first be lodged with the management representative who must be appointed by the 
certified facility pursuant to Chapter IV.9.11 of the SA8000. He is ‘responsible for ensuring that there 
is a confidential, accessible system for workers to lodge complaints should workers find 
nonconformities to SA8000’ (Article 6.1). According to SAAS, ‘complaints are best handled at the 
lowest level’.
57
 The complainant may be assisted by an SA8000 worker representative or trade union 
representative, if existing (Article 6.2). ‘Management must respond within a reasonable, set period of 
time’ (Article 6.3) and its response must include reference to possible root cause analysis, corrective 
action and preventive action. 
Subsequently, if the complainant is not satisfied with the response or solution, he may lodge a 
complaint with the certification body responsible for the company or facility involved (Article 6.5 and 
7) and is encouraged to send a copy of this complaint to SAAS (Article 7.2). This complaint may be 
lodged ‘by any interested party (such as a worker, NGO, community group, teacher/professor or 
trade union)’. The certification body must protect the identity of the complainant unless the 
complainant chooses to expose his identity (Article 7.1). The complaint must be as detailed and 
substantiated as possible and must include documented evidence (Article 7.3). The certification body 
will review the complaint and may conduct an unscheduled audit during its investigation. The 
certification body’s final report with its conclusions is sent to the complainant with a copy to SAAS. 
The SAAS will in due time review the certification body’s investigation (Article 7.5 and 7.6). 
Finally, if the complainant is not satisfied with the outcome of the investigation, it may lodge a 
complaint with SAAS (Article 7.6 and 5.5-5.8). Complaints lodged with the SAAS must be made in 
writing (hardcopy or e-mail) and must be fully detailed, including objective evidence. No format is 
prescribed but a form is available upon request (Article 5.5).
58
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 At <www.saasaccreditation.org/complaints.htm>. 
58
 See also on this grievance mechanism: C. Rees, Overview of a Selection of Existing Accountability 
Mechanisms for Handling Complaints and Disputes, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper 
37, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2007, pp. 18-20; C. Rees, 
Grievance Mechanisms for Business and Human Rights: Strengths, Weaknesses and Gaps, Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 40, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA, 2008, pp. 8, 18, 25; C. Rees, D. Vermijs, Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in the Business and 
Human Rights Arena, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Report No. 28, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2008, pp. 45-47. 
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The complaint procedure provides for a grievance mechanism which is not sector specific. Its scope is 
limited to SA8000 certified companies, but extends to workers of all its suppliers, sub-suppliers and 
home workers all over the world. It appears to be multi-layered (local representative, certification 
body involved, SAAS) with exhaustion of each remedy before advancing to the next. The procedure 
appears to be accessible and transparent (apart from time limits) and can be used by workers (with 
consideration for their anonymity) and other interested parties, which includes NGOs and trade 
unions. 
2.2.3 Ethical Trading Initiative code violation procedure 
The ETI was established in 1998 by an alliance of companies, trade unions and NGOs in the United 
Kingdom and provides for a Base Code with labor standards to which ETI members must commit. 
Additionally, ETI provides for a grievance mechanism in relation to alleged noncompliance of this ETI 
Base Code
59
 pursuant to the 2001 ETI Alleged Code Violation Investigation Guidelines. These 
Guidelines may be considered by members of ETI (corporations, trade unions and NGOs (Article 
3.1))
60
 and are intended ‘(a) to ensure that alleged code violations are brought to ETI member 
companies in a way that facilitates the investigation of the allegation, (b) to ensure that the 
investigation of the allegation, and any remediation found to be necessary, occurs expeditiously and 
transparently, (c) to encourage the sharing of information amongst ETI members about supply chain 
labour practices, and (d) to build positive working relationships and the confidence of stakeholder 
groups in each other’ (Article 2 Guidelines). Furthermore, the Guidelines are intended to produce a 
final result (Article 4.1). The alleged violations must be either ‘specific and very serious, requiring an 
instant response’ or ‘specific or on-going, requiring prompt investigation in line with these guidelines’ 
in order to fall within the scope of these Guidelines. 
Allegations must be made after gathering as much information as possible and must be submitted in 
writing to the company involved with a copy to the ETI secretariat (Article 7 Guidelines). The 
submission should include, among other things, the identification of the supplier site, the alleged 
code breach, the scale of the breach, any parallel proceedings in relation to the allegations, any 
preferred solution of employees, the relationship between the affected employees and the entity 
making the allegation, any relevant local complexities (Article 7.4 Guidelines). Under certain 
circumstances the names of individual employees may be withheld; in case code breaches affect 
large numbers of people, names of individual employees are not necessary (Article 8.1-8.2 
Guidelines). 
After communicating the allegations, the relevant parties should meet as soon as possible and record 
their decisions in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This MoU should include, among other 
things, whether or not the allegation triggers the Guidelines; which ETI members are affected; the 
degree of leverage of the company involved with respect to the supplier; degree of confidentiality; 
the way of investigation, including timetable, and evaluation of remediation (Article 9 Guidelines). 
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 The ETI Base Code also formed the basis of other codes of conduct, including the Code of Conduct of the 
Wine Industry Ethical Trade Association, see <www.wieta.org.za/>. 
60
 Allegations may also be made by partners or affiliates of the trade union and NGO members, provided that 
the allegation is supported by an ETI member, which ‘should satisfy itself that the allegation is soundly based 
before approaching the company’ (Article 3.2 and 3.3). 
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The investigation is intended to establish the facts and may be carried out by ‘specialist outside 
organisations’. ‘The investigator should conduct off-site interviews with employees of the supplier 
where this is necessary for the employees to freely express themselves’ (Article 10.2 Guidelines) and 
lay down his findings in an investigation report which should be shared with all relevant people and 
entities involved (article 12). 
If the original complainants do not agree with the findings of the investigation, the ETI member 
company should take this into account and provide for further inquiry and may eventually engage ‘an 
independent investigator agreeable to both sides’ (Article 14.4 and 14.5 Guidelines). According to 
Rees and Vermijs this could be a mediator.
61
 In case the investigation confirms that a breach has 
taken place, the relevant ETI member company is responsible for negotiation a remediation plan with 
the supplier and for monitoring the implementation of remediation (Article 13 and 15 Guidelines).
62
 
The scope of the ETI code violation procedure is limited to breaches of the ETI Base Code, which is 
not sector specific. Further, access to this grievance mechanism is (formally) limited to ETI members, 
i.e. UK based corporations, unions and NGOs. The scope of ETI members’ responsibilities is extended 
to include their supply chains, however. Individual workers, in particular the workers employed in the 
supply chain, are referred to other ways of redress. The procedure is relatively detailed, yet informal, 
and aims to achieve a mutually satisfactory solution, if necessary with the help of a third party 
(investigation or mediation). The ETI itself only plays a marginal role. 
2.2.4 Business Social Compliance Initiative complaint mechanism 
The BSCI was established in 2002 by the Fair Trade Association (FTA)
63
 to provide a uniform and 
consistent social compliance system for the global supply chains of FTA members. A uniform system 
was necessary due to the ‘proliferation of individual codes, varying audit procedures and diverging 
approaches’.
64
 A large number of European companies and a few non-FTA members participate in 
the BSCI (small and large companies irrespective of production and dealing with suppliers from all 
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 C. Rees, D. Vermijs, Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in the Business and Human Rights Arena, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Initiative Report No. 28, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA, 2008, p. 43. Similarly C. Rees, Overview of a Selection of Existing Accountability Mechanisms 
for Handling Complaints and Disputes, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper 37, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2007, p. 22; C. Rees, Grievance 
Mechanisms for Business and Human Rights: Strengths, Weaknesses and Gaps, Corporate Social Responsibility 
Initiative, Working Paper No. 40, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 
2008, p. 25. 
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 See also on this grievance mechanism C. Rees, Overview of a Selection of Existing Accountability Mechanisms 
for Handling Complaints and Disputes, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper 37, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2007, pp. 21-23; C. Rees, Grievance 
Mechanisms for Business and Human Rights: Strengths, Weaknesses and Gaps, Corporate Social Responsibility 
Initiative, Working Paper No. 40, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 
2008, p. 8; C. Rees, D. Vermijs, Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in the Business and Human Rights Arena, 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative Report No. 28, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, MA, 2008, pp. 42-45. 
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 The FTA is a European organization, established in 1977, ‘to represent the foreign trade interests of 
European retailers and importers towards European and International institutions.’ At <www.fta-intl.org/who-
we-are/who-is-the-fta>. 
64
 At <www.bsci-intl.org/about-bsci/why-bsci-exists>. 
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over the world), each of which has committed to implement the BSCI Code of Conduct (available in 
27 languages)
65
 in its supply chain relations. 
As provided in the BSCI principles, compliance with the Code of Conduct is monitored through 
independent auditing companies (using a common and extensive database to prevent duplication), 
but does not lead to certification. The BSCI does encourage companies, however, to go further and 
‘achieve [the] best practice, the SA8000 social management system and certification developed by 
Social Accountability International (SAI).’
66
 
The BSCI Code of Conduct requires suppliers to provide for an internal grievance mechanism to deal 
with BSCI related complaints from employees or third parties,
67
 for example by means of suggestion 
boxes of worker committees.
68
 Additionally, as from 2010, BSCI auditors provide the workers they 
interview with contact details of local BSCI contacts if they would like to report a complaint against 
their company. The same information must be included in the posters which must be displayed in the 
factory. BSCI will then determine on a case-by-case basis whether or not to investigate the 
complaint, in which the BSCI member and the auditor will be involved. This complaint mechanism is 
currently only available in China and India but will be expanded to other countries.
69
 
The BSCI is not sector specific but the scope of its complaint mechanism is limited to (the supply 
chains of) BSCI participants and is currently only available for workers in India and China. Its 
complaint mechanism does not appear to be formalized yet and appears to be focused on complaints 
from local workers only and complementary to empowering of BSCI participants by training and 
engagement of local stakeholders. 
2.2.5 Fair Labor Association Third-Party Complaint Procedure 
The FLA is a ‘non-profit organization [established in 1999 and] committed to protecting workers’ 
rights and improving working conditions worldwide’ in the apparel and footwear industry.
70
 The 
FLA’s mission is ‘to combine the efforts of business, civil society organizations, and colleges and 
universities to protect workers’ rights and improve working conditions worldwide by promoting 
adherence to international labor standards’.
71
 In order to fulfill its mission, the FLA will ‘determine 
whether the Applicable Products of each Participating Company are produced in Compliance with the 
Fair Labor Association Standards’ and ‘continue to address questions critical to the elimination of 
unfair labor practices’.
72
 The FLA’s standards have been laid down in the FLA Workplace Code of 
Conduct (first drafted in 1998) by those companies (and their suppliers) that have committed to the 
FLA (1900 companies and 185 colleges and universities). 
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 Business Social Compliance Initiative Code of Conduct, 2009. 
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 At <www.bsci-intl.org/about-bsci/prinicples-of-BSCI>. 
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 Business Social Compliance Initiative Code of Conduct, 2009, p. 5. 
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 BSCI Echo No. 7 – 2010, p. 1. 
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 BSCI Echo No. 7 – 2010, p. 1. BSCI Press Release of 9 November 2009, ‘The Business Social Compliance 
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 At <www.fairlabor.org>. 
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 Charter Document of the FLA, 16 February 2010, preamble. 
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 Charter Document of the FLA, 16 February 2010, preamble. 
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Pursuant to the FLA’s Charter, Participating Companies (companies which have submitted to the 
FLA’s program and whose participation has been approved by the FLA) are subject to monitoring and 
may be subjected to third-party complaints (Section XI). A third party is defined as ‘any person or 
organization that has initiated a Complaint with respect to a Facility (…)’, while a complaint must be 
related to ‘any significant and/or persistent pattern of noncompliance, or any individual incident of 
serious noncompliance with the Workplace Code or Monitoring Principles (…)’.
73
 According to the 
FLA, this procedure is not intended to undermine internal or local grievance mechanisms and ‘is 
meant to be a tool of last resort when other channels have failed to protect workers’ rights.’
74
 
The procedure for such third-party complaints is set out in Section XI of the FLA Charter, and consists 
of four steps. These steps are, in short: 
1. Lodging the complaint. Complaints are lodged with the executive director of the FLA and 
must ‘contain reliable, specific and verifiable evidence or information’ that a (participating) 
company breached its responsibilities under the FLA code. A web-based complaint form (in 
English) is provided on the FLA website,
75
 which can be sent by mail, e-mail or fax to the FLA 
or to other institutions which may be expected to pass on this information to the FLA. 
Complaints may also be lodged by phone. If the complainant wishes to remain anonymous, 
he must indicate so. The FLA will subsequently consult with the complainant and will assess 
whether or not the complaint will be dealt with. If the complaint will not be taken into 
consideration, then the executive director will inform the complainant in writing and explain 
the decision. 
2. Informing the company involved. If the FLA decides to take the complaint into consideration, 
it will inform the company involved about the complaint and will give the company a 
preliminary indication of the standards which may be breached. The company involved will 
then have 45 days to investigate the complaint internally or to request that the complaint 
will be assessed by the FLA. If the company involved chooses to investigate the complaint 
internally, it must report its findings by the end of the 45-day period. The complainant then 
has the right to reply to these findings. If the FLA is satisfied with the end result it may 
terminate the proceedings and provide a summary report to the company and the 
complainant. The FLA has the right to take preliminary measures at any point during the 
proceedings. 
3. Assessing of the complaint by FLA. If the FLA decides to further assess the complaint, it must 
determine whether to proceed through the use of an expert or an Independent External 
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 Charter Document of the FLA, 16 February 2010, Section I. 
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 Through <www.fairlabor.org>. Pursuant to Principle 4 of the Principles of Fair labor and Responsible 
Sourcing, each FLA affiliate must provide for a confidential reporting channel for workers. In 2003, Ascoly and 
Zeldenrust reported that FLA members had implemented this obligation in various ways, including ‘through 
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cards with the workers after interviewing them (Adidas, Levi, Nike).’ N. Ascoly, I. Zeldenrust, Considering 
Complaint Mechanisms: An Important Tool for Code Monitoring and Verification, SOMO, December 2003, 
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Monitor, which is ‘a monitor which has been accredited by the Association (…)’. According to 
Rees, there is broad flexibility in the available approaches, which ‘frequently involve 
mediation, with the role of neutral mediator taken either by the FLA President or Executive 
Director or by local experts.’
76
 The assessor must have access to all relevant information and 
must perform his work in a timely manner. He must report to the FLA in writing. The 
company involved will have to pay the FLA for the assessment. The company has the right to 
terminate the process at any time. In that case it would have to make a summary report for 
the company involved and the complainant. 
4. Remediation. If the assessor concludes that a breach is likely, then the company involved will 
work with the FLA to develop an appropriate remediation plan. If the company involved 
decides to proceed with remediation, then it will make a remediation plan within 30 days. 
The FLA will make a Tracking Chart on its website within 90 days after the assessment made 
in step 3, and which will include all remediation steps. The FLA will make summary reports as 
long as necessary and will submit a final report when the remediation has been completed. 
Pursuant to Section XI(B) all parties involved may disseminate public information as to the complaint 
while the FLA may disclose information necessary to correct any misrepresentations.
77
 
It appears therefore that the FLA provides for a detailed, formalized, and well-developed grievance 
mechanism in relation to labor standards in the textile industry. Its scope extends to workers in the 
supply chain of FLA member or affiliated companies. The FLA third-party complaint procedure is 
intended to be a remedy in last resort, to be complementary to local and internal grievance 
mechanisms and to deal only with significant cases of noncompliance (either individual cases or a 
pattern of noncompliance). It appears that the FLA provides for an accessible (apart from the 
complaint form which is only available in English) and transparent procedure for workers and 
organizations. Complaints are investigated by the FLA and/or third-parties, which may include 
mediators. 
2.2.6 Fair Wear Foundation complaints procedure 
The FWF was established in 1999 and intends to improve labour conditions in the garment industry. 
It has about fifty member companies and is governed by trade unions, NGOs and business 
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associations.
78
 FWF member companies have committed to the FWF Code of Labour Practices which 
was drafted in 2009. 
The Fair Wear Foundation Charter provides for a complaints procedure as part of the FWF’s 
verification process (Section 5). The FWF verification process further consists of country studies, 
factory audits, management system audits and reporting. The complaint procedure is intended as a 
measure of last resort, ‘in case an internal grievance mechanism of the factory failed or is absent.’
79
 
The complaints procedure of the Fair Wear Foundation may be invoked by a number of stakeholders, 
including the workers involved, NGOs (such as the Clean Clothes Campaign),
 80
 trade unions and may 
relate to individual complaints from an employee or a collective complaint from the workforce in 
relation to the general labor circumstances, including core labor standards. It consists of eight steps. 
1. Operationalization of the procedure in the countries involved. This is carried out by 
publication of the procedure at the FWF website and by informing the workers and partner 
organizations in the relevant countries. 
2. Reception of the complaint. Complaints may be submitted to FWF directly or to the ‘local 
complaints handler’ (a person or an organization) who has been appointed by FWF in the 
relevant countries or regions and who must speak the local language. Complaints may be 
made in writing (e-mail, letter) or verbally (telephone, personal contact) and must be passed 
on to FWF immediately if made with the local complaints handler. Complainants may remain 
anonymous. Costs at this stage will be paid for by FWF. 
3. Admissibility of the complaint. The FWF shall make a decision on the admissibility of the 
complaint within six days and inform the complainant accordingly. This decision cannot be 
appealed. The admissibility of the complaint will be assessed by FWF by reference to the 
subject matter and the company involved. Complaints must relate to the FWF Code of 
Labour Practices and must be addressed to a member company or a supplier of a member 
company. Costs will be borne by FWF at this stage. The member company will be informed 
about the complaint and its admissibility. 
4. Investigation of the complaint. If admissible, the FWF will make an investigation plan and will, 
with input of the member company involved, follow the regular audit procedure
81
 as to the 
number of sources consulted. The FWF will make a proposal for corrective action and FWF 
will bear the costs. A member company may decide on additional investigations (at its own 
costs). All parties involved will be informed about the decision of the FWF. At this stage, the 
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FWF may involve third parties, such as the FLA,
 82
 or expert mediators, according to Rees and 
Vermijs.
83
 
5. Remediation of the complaint. The member company and the ‘accused party ‘ will, together 
with the complainant and / or their representatives draft a corrective action plan and ensure 
its implementation. The FWF will verify the progress with the settlement. 
6. Monitoring of remediation. The member company will monitor corrective action. 
7. Verification and reporting of remediation. The FWF is responsible for execution of the 
complaints procedure and will verify that remediation is implemented. FWF will publish the 
details of every complaint on its website and in its newsletters. 
8. Appeal. If a party is not satisfied with the outcome of the procedure, he may lodge an appeal 
with the Executive Board of the FWF. The Executive Board will consider the advice of the 
FWF Committee of Experts.
84
 
The FWF provides for a complaints procedure for workers in the textile industry. The scope of this 
complaints procedure is limited to workers of FWF member companies and in particular to workers 
who are part of FWF’s supply chain. The complaints procedure is intended to be used as a means of 
last resort. The procedure is well-developed and formalized and appears to be accessible (easy 
access by various means, preferably through a local contact and no costs for the complainant) and 
transparent for workers and interested parties. FWF involves a network of local staff (‘conflict 
handlers’) and third parties for conflict resolution and cooperates with other organizations in this 
field. 
2.2.7 Worker Rights Consortium complaint mechanism 
The WRC was established in 2000 by a group of ‘university administrators, students, and 
international labor rights experts’
85
 in order to improve the working conditions and labor standards 
of the workers who manufacture the clothing and merchandize which bear college and university 
indicia. The WRC promotes socially responsible initiatives and awareness in this area and surveys 
compliance with labor standards (based on its Model Code of Conduct)
86
 which universities and their 
licensees
87
 need to observe. The WRC surveys compliance by conducting independent and in-depth 
                                                          
82
 FWF Complaints Report of 13 July 2011 regarding JC Rags Turkey (freedom of association; collective 
bargaining and non-discrimination). 
83
 C. Rees, D. Vermijs, Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in the Business and Human Rights Arena, Corporate 
Social Responsibility Initiative Report No. 28, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA, 2008, p. 31. 
84
 Fair Wear Foundation – Complaints Procedure, 2009. Generally also on this grievance mechanism C. Rees, D. 
Vermijs, Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in the Business and Human Rights Arena, Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiative Report No. 28, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
MA, 2008, pp. 30-32. 
85
 At <www.workersrights.org/about/history.asp>. 
86
 At <www.workersrights.org/about/>. See also the Bylaws of the Worker Rights Consortium. 
87
 The WRC Model Code of Conduct defines licensees in Section I.C as ‘all persons or entities which have 
entered into a written ‘License Agreement’ with the University manufacture ‘Licensed Articles’ (as that term is 
defined in the License Agreement) bearing the names, trademarks and/or images of one or more Member 
Institutions.’ 
24 
 
investigations and publicly disseminates this information.
88
 Currently 181 North American colleges 
and universities are affiliated with WRC (they are not members of WRC) which means that they have 
accepted the responsibility to hold licensees accountable for the treatment of the workers used.
89
 ‘It 
is the responsibility of the licensee to ensure that workers are not exploited.’
90
 
In order to observe its responsibility to survey compliance, the WRC provides for a complaint 
mechanism. The WRC investigates working conditions when it receives complaints from workers or 
when it receives information from other sources, such as local NGOs and trade unions with which the 
WRC is in contact (most commonly). Complaints may also be submitted directly to the WRC through 
an online form, which is available in English and nine other languages. Complainants must provide 
information regarding the country of operation and the name of the factory as well as a ‘detailed 
description of worker rights violation/s’ and a telephone number. The WRC will keep name and 
contact information confidential unless indicated otherwise.  
A complaint may lead to an investigation
91
 which may include interview with workers and the 
gathering of relevant documentation. According to Rees, the WRC ‘is more of an advocacy or 
campaign-based organisation’ and investigates complaints in case of ‘a particularly serious problem 
and where the WRC estimates that their intervention could lead to remediation and wide systemic 
change.’ Investigations are carried out by ‘teams composed of local community representatives and 
experts, who are independent of the factory and workers, as well as WRC staff.’ By doing so, the WRC 
may ‘increase the prospects for effective locally-led grievance processes in the future.’
92
  
If a breach of labor standards is identified, ‘the WRC develops recommendations for remedial action, 
in consultation with workers’, which may involve mediation between the parties involved,
93
 and 
outreach to the communities where the workers live.
94
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The WRC provides for a grievance mechanism for workers in the textile sector. Its scope is limited to 
workers who work at companies which supply to companies licensed to use WRC affiliated university 
or college indicia. The procedure is easily accessible for workers and other interested parties and 
often triggered by local contacts of the WRC, such as NGOs and trade unions. The procedure does 
not appear to be as formalized as the above-mentioned procedures. A complaint triggers an inquiry 
by the WRC after which the WRC, aided by third parties, if necessary, attempts to strive for a solution 
which is satisfactory to all parties involved. 
2.2.8 Clean Clothes Campaign Urgent Appeals System 
The CCC was established in 1989 and is an alliance of trade unions and NGOs in 15 European 
countries relying on a partner network consisting of more than 200 organizations. It intends to 
educate and mobilize consumers and lobby companies and governments.
95
 The CCC Code of Labour 
Practices for the Apparel Industry Including Sportswear was adopted in 1998 and is intended for 
retailers as well as manufacturers and all other companies in the supply chain. The Code assumes the 
existence of a complaint mechanism
96
 involving the Foundation, which is the CCC’s monitoring body 
(Section IV, under Monitoring Basic Principles). The Board of the Foundation consists of 
representatives from multiple stakeholders (trade unions and NGOs as well as companies). The 
Foundation must provide for ‘a means by which workers and any others can report on a confidential 
basis observance of the code’ (Section IV, of the Code under Introduction). 
Additionally, the CCC provides for an ‘Urgent Appeals System’.
97
 The Urgent Appeals System is 
characterized by the CCC as a ‘direct solidarity action’ and will lead to various forms of actions by the 
CCC upon the request of garment workers and their representatives whose rights have been violated. 
These actions include the writing of letters of protest, public e-mail or fax campaigns and awareness 
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raising events.
98
 Some actions, however, may ‘never make it to the public; instead at the request of 
the workers or their organizations the CCC works behind the scenes to help create a space so that 
workers’ concerns are heard by local management, public authorities, brand-name garment 
companies and retailers, and others who have a responsibility to ensure compliance with good labor 
standards throughout international garment industry supply chains.’
99
 The workers and their 
representatives will eventually decide which actions are undertaken in view of their knowledge of 
the local circumstances and the risks involved. 
Requests for actions must be addressed to the CCC International Secretariat and the local CCC appeal 
coordinator and must include, among other things, a description of the rights violated, a summary of 
the workers’ demands, and the names and contact information of the factory involved, the owner of 
the factory and the organizations and unions involved. 
The CCC has taken on about 30 appeals per year over the last few years, in particular in relation to 
violations of the four core labor standards. 
Different from the previous grievance mechanisms, the Urgent Appeals System of the CCC is informal 
and does not appear to be limited to companies affiliated with the CCC. The procedure appears to be 
accessible to anyone who claims to have an interest. In consultation with the complainants, the CCC 
will undertake action, which includes public campaigning. However, if necessary, the CCC will act 
silently, behind the scenes, which may involve third-parties, such as expert mediators. The regular 
CCC complaints mechanism involving the Foundation is not clear. 
2.2.9 International Council of Toy Industries CARE Foundation Hotline 
The ICTI was established in 1975 and is composed of national toy industry associations from 20 
states. It was founded to ‘act as a center of discussion and information exchange on trends and 
issues important to the toy industry, to promote safety standards, to reduce or eliminate barriers to 
trade, and to advance social responsibility in the industry with programs to address environmental 
concerns, fair and lawful employment practices and workplace safety.’
100
 In order to promote worker 
safety and health, ICTI drafted a Code of Business Practices
101
 in 1995, which includes labor 
standards, which each member company is expected to observe. 
Section 3(a) of the Code provides that the ‘purpose of this Code is to establish a standard of 
performance, to educate, and to encourage commitment to responsible manufacturing, not to 
punish.’ ICTI member companies must evaluate their own facilities and those of their contractors and 
statements of compliance must be signed by officers of each manufacturing companies or 
contractors. (Section 3(b) and (c)). 
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The Code also provides that it ‘should be posted or [made] available for all employees in the local 
language’ (final sentence) by means of posters or cards. These posters and cards include a hotline 
telephone number which workers may use to submit complaints. 
In 2002, ICTI set up a program in order to ensure implementation of ICTI’s codes which is carried out 
by ICTI’s Caring, Awareness, Responsible, Ethical (CARE) Foundation. CARE aims to set one standard 
for toy manufacturing and oversees monitoring for compliance with the codes, including the auditor 
qualification and certification processes. Since 80% of the world’s toys are manufactured in China, 
ICTI CARE is focused on China.
102
 This is also apparent from the hotline number on the cards and 
posters which each factory needs to publish, which is monitored by a Chinese NGO.
103
 
The ICTI CARE program includes an informal grievance mechanism for workers in the toy 
manufacturing industry. It is limited to workers in China who work for ICTI-member suppliers. It 
appears to be accessible (phone), informal and not adversarial (in view of the object and purpose of 
the Code as expressed in Section 3 of the Code ). Any grievances appear to be addressed within the 
context of the audit and certification processes. 
2.3 Labor-inclusive grievance mechanisms 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In addition to labor-only grievance mechanisms, a number of organizations or initiatives include labor 
disputes within the scope of their grievance mechanisms. Two examples of labor-inclusive grievance 
mechanisms – UTZ Certified and the Rain Forest Alliance – are discussed in subsequent paragraphs 
(section 3.2 and 3.3). 
Both organizations have in common that they are focused on sustainability of business operations, 
which includes compliance with social/labor standards, and that they provide for certification. 
2.3.2 UTZ Certified Complaint Handling Procedure 
UTZ Certified was established in 1999 by two business partners (a coffee grower and a coffee roaster) 
in order to improve the sustainability of the coffee industry by means of certification on the basis of 
codes of conduct.
104
 Sustainability models for tea and cocoa were added in subsequent years. 
According to UTZ, one-third of all coffee is UTZ certified, and global market leaders have committed 
to the program. UTZ Certified is sponsored by a number of private and public organizations, including 
the Postcode Loterij and Agentschap NL. 
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In order to achieve sustainability of the coffee, tea and cocoa sectors, UTZ Certified provides field 
training through a field support network and provides standards, certification monitoring and 
traceability services. UTZ Certified provides for separate codes of conduct for coffee,
105
 cocoa,
106
 and 
tea (both for tea farms and factories as well as rooibos producers and processors).
107
 These codes of 
conduct have been developed on the basis of multi-stakeholder discussion and are continuously 
reviewed and updated.
108
 The UTZ Certified codes of conduct are generally focused on sustainable 
harvesting and environmental aspects, but some parts deal with worker rights, including the four 
core labor standards. 
Compliance with these codes is checked on an annual basis through independent auditors. 
Additionally, UTZ Certified provides for a complaint mechanism,
109
 which allows any person or 
organization to complain or express suspicions about producers, traders, roasters and others about 
alleged noncompliance with ‘the regulations and/or the spirit of the UTZ CERTIFIED program and 
requirements.’ Complaints must be substantiated with documentary evidence and UTZ Certified will 
deal with the complaint as it deems necessary depending on the nature of the complaint and in 
consultation with the complainant.
110
 
The UTZ Certified complaint procedure is as transparent as possible and consists of various steps:
111
 
1. Submission of complaint form with evidence by e-mail or fax to UTZ Certified. UTZ Certified 
registers the complaint form under a unique registration number; indicates a responsible 
case manager, and confirms receipt to the complainant within five working days of receipt of 
the form. UTZ Certified also informs the complainant about the responsible case manager. 
2. UTZ Certified will contact the complainant, if necessary, within ten working days after receipt 
of the complaint form, for further clarification or proof. 
3. UTZ Certified proposes a solution and/or action plan to the complainant by fax or by e-mail 
within twenty working days after receipt of the complaint form or within twenty days after 
receipt of further requested evidence. 
4. If the complainant does not agree with the solution, he informs UTZ Certified within ten 
working days in writing, after which UTZ Certified again contacts the complainant. It appears 
that the previous steps are then repeated. 
UTZ Certified keeps records of all documentation in relation to complaints for five years. It will 
engage a third party if the objectivity of UTZ Certified is at stake. UTZ Certified will not accept claims 
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for financial compensation but always strives to reach a solution which is acceptable to all parties 
involved. 
UTZ Certified appears to be well-organized and provides for a complaints procedure. The scope of 
this procedure is limited to complaints in relation to noncompliance with provisions and/or the spirit 
of the UTZ Certified codes of conduct by UTZ Certified companies. The procedure is accessible, 
formalized and transparent (including clear time lines, but unclear as to when the ‘respondent’ is 
engaged), and may be seized by any interested party. UTZ Certified may involve third-parties and 
strives for a solution which is acceptable to all parties involved and is thus not adversarial in 
character. 
2.3.3 Rain Forest Alliance 
The Rain Forest Alliance, which is also a member of the ISEAL Alliance, was established in 1986 after 
a major conference in New York City on the worldwide destruction of rain forests.
112
 Currently Rain 
Forest Alliance provides certification services to companies which conduct their operations in a 
sustainable manner – in particular in the timber industry, agriculture, cattle ranching and tourism.
113
 
In order to be rewarded with one of Rain Forest Alliance’s certificates, companies need to meet both 
social (labor) and environmental standards.
114
 
With respect to its work on sustainable agriculture, Rain Forest Alliance’s certification is based on the 
environmental and social standards of the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), which is a coalition 
of five conservation groups (including Rain Forest Alliance) and which was founded in 1997.
115
 The 
SAN standards
116
 are based on ten guiding principles,
117
 one of which relates to working conditions. 
With respect to sustainably forestry, Rain Forest Alliance’s certification is based on the standards of 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), which was established in 1993 by a group of timber users, 
trader and environmental and human rights organizations in the United States.
118
 Some of the FSC’s 
standards provide for worker rights.
119
 
Complaints in relation to Rain Forest Alliance certification for sustainable agriculture may be lodged 
with Sustainable Farm Certification, International (SFC), which is the Rain Forest Alliance/SAN’s 
certification body.
120
 Complaints about a farm or an appeal against a certification decision may be 
lodged by a ‘person or organization’ by means of a complaints/appeals form. In this complaints form, 
which may be submitted by e-mail or fax or mail, the complainant (whose information will remain 
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confidential, must explain the nature of his complaint.
121
 Although the SFC refers to a ‘Procedure to 
handle complaints’, no further documentation can be found on the SFC’s website.
122
 
Complaints and appeals in relation to Rain Forest Alliance certification for sustainable forestry, must 
be addressed to SmartWood, the Rain Forest Alliance’s forestry certification program since 1989.
123
 
Complaints can be made by relevant stakeholders. Complaints may be made in writing or verbally (in 
which case the SmartWood staff member will put the complaint in writing), and an internal log is 
made on the internal computer drives. SmartWood will respond in writing within 14 days. 
SmartWood will subsequently inform the certified operation within seven days after receipt of the 
complaint, but will keep the name of the complainant confidential if so requested or if this is deemed 
necessary by SmartWood. The certified operation may then respond, preferably in writing. Within 14 
days after receiving the complaint, SmartWood will respond to the complainant, with or without 
comments from the certified operation or relevant third parties. SmartWood shall investigate the 
complaint within three months of the date on which the complaint was received. If the complainant 
is not satisfied with the outcome of the investigation, he may request in writing the opportunity to 
lay his claim before a third party responsible for resolving grievances made against Rain Forest 
Alliance and SmartWood, for example the Rain Forest Alliance Chief of Agriculture. If, at that stage, 
no resolution is found, then the complainant may submit his complaint, in writing, to the Director of 
SmartWood or to the relevant standard setting body, such as the FSC. If a resolution is reached, such 
resolution will be included in a memorandum for closure which shall be distributed to the relevant 
entities involved.
124
 
Rain Forest Alliance apparently provides for a complaint mechanism in relation to its certification of 
sustainable agriculture and sustainable forestry. Both areas are subjected to different codes (and are 
therefore limited to those companies which are certified on the basis of these codes) and the 
grievance mechanisms involved are dealt with by different organizations. In view of the complex 
interrelationship between Rain Forest Alliance and the various organizations involved, the 
mechanisms do not appear to be very accessible or transparent. The threshold for making a 
complaint does not appear to be high though. 
2.4 Ad hoc agreements 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Apart from labor-only and labor-inclusive grievance mechanisms provided by NGOs/multi-
stakeholder initiatives, also ad hoc agreements may provide for grievance mechanisms in relation to 
labor. Two examples will be discussed further below: agreements between companies and local 
communities (section 4.2); and high-level agreements between companies and global trade unions or 
federations (section 4.3). Both agreement categories are relatively new phenomena in international 
business relations. 
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2.4.2 Company – community agreements 
In 2005 and 2006, Chevron Nigeria Limited and Shell Petroleum Development Company introduced a 
new approach in their working with local communities with respect to their investments in local 
development projects. Whereas in the past, they concluded large numbers of bilateral development 
agreements with individual communities in the Niger Delta, since 2005 and 2006 both oil companies 
have now entered into agreements with groups or clusters of communities. In these agreements, so-
called Global Memorandums of Understanding (GMoUs),
125
 the oil companies and these clusters of 
communities, represented by a board or council, regulate the investments of Chevron and Shell in 
social projects and programs. These boards or councils then make key decisions – in cooperation with 
NGO
126
 and local and state government representatives – on the way the investments are allocated, 
which aims to promote cohesion and cooperation as well as increased local ownership, 
accountability and participation in development activities. Shell has reportedly entered into GMoUs 
with 24 clusters, covering 244 communities in the Niger Delta; Chevron reportedly entered into eight 
GMoUs in five states in the Niger Delta reaching more than 400 communities.
127
 
GMoUs do not appear to be legally binding. This is confirmed by the text of a draft GMoU between 
Chevron Nigeria Limited and local communities (as represented by the Regional Development 
Council) and the State Government, which is on file with the author. Article 10 of this GMoU 
provides: ‘Each Party acknowledges that this MOU is intended to be an expression of mutual intent 
and understanding, and is not intended to be a legally binding agreement between the Parties. 
Accordingly, this MOU may be terminated at any time by any Party hereto by giving written notice of 
such termination to the other Parties. In the event that this MOU is not so terminated, the term of 
this MOU shall be for a period of 4 years (…).’ 
Conflict prevention plays an important role in this new GMoU approach of Chevron and Shell. In the 
above-mentioned draft GMoU of Chevron, it is provided that the purpose of the GMoU is ‘to work 
together to create a climate of understanding between the Parties so as to achieve’ the objectives of 
participatory partnership, transparency and accountability, capacity building, safety, security and rule 
of law, community empowerment and sustainable development.
128
 Article 4.1.4 of the GMoU 
provides for the establishment of a Conflict Resolution Committee (CRC), which is composed, among 
others, of representatives of the Regional Development Council, Chevron, the State and NGOs. The 
main function of the CRC is to assist Chevron to resolve conflicts which arise in the implementation of 
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 The scope and implementation of GMoUs are evaluated by the African Centre for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, which is led by Austin Onuoha. See <www.accrafrica.org>. See also, for example: ‘GMOU 
Participatory Stakeholder Evaluation; A Joint Evaluation of the Global Memoranda of Understanding between 
Chevron, Community Organizations and State Governments in the Niger Delta, October 2008 (RTI International, 
Search for Common Ground, Consensus Building Institute) through <cbuilding.org>. 
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an NGO which helps implementing these GMoUs, among other things by providing training and manuals. See 
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 Shell Briefing Note on Global Memorandum of Understanding, April 2011, at 
<www.shell.com.ng/home/content/nga/environment_society/shell_in_the_society/gmou/>; and 
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 Draft Global Memorandum of Understanding between Chevron Nigeria Limited (on behalf of the 
NNPC/Chevron joint venture and the Regional Development Council and the State Government, preamble. 
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the GMoU and which cannot be resolved by Chevron through its internal grievance mechanism 
(Article 4.1.4(c) and 6.3 GMoU). 
Conflicts may arise in relation to various issues, including to labor and employment. The nature of 
these conflicts is different than the nature of the conflicts dealt with by the above-mentioned 
grievance mechanisms, however. Pursuant to Article 2.1 GMoU, Chevron has committed itself to 
make sure that contractors which carry out work for Chevron hire as many workers from the local 
communities (represented by the Regional Development Council) as the contract may require. The 
Article further regulates termination of contracts of community workers, compensation rates, safety 
regulations and work codes and practices, and strikes; contracting and sub-contracting of work 
(Articles 2.2 and 2.3); company employment (Article 2.4; providing for the recognition that Chevron 
is an equal opportunity employer); and the provision of scholarships and contribution to teachers’ 
programs by Chevron (Article 2.5).There is no reference to the contents of labor standards or the 
four core labor standards. 
The scope of the above-mentioned grievance mechanism in the GMoU between Chevron and local 
communities is limited to grievances related to the implementation of the GMoU. As far as labor is 
concerned this means that grievances are limited to the employment responsibilities of Chevron and 
not to working conditions of Chevron’s workers. The procedure before the multi-stakeholder CRC is a 
procedure of last resort and appears to be accessible. The GMoU does not provide for procedural 
rules and the character of the procedure may be informal, due to the composition of the CRC. 
2.4.3 Company – trade union agreements 
Since 1988, over fifty multinational enterprises from various industries have entered into agreements 
with international trade unions to provide for a framework for constructive negotiations. These 
agreements, also known as global framework agreements (GFAs), international framework 
agreements (IFAs) or transnational company agreements (TCAs)
129
 are instruments are intended ‘to 
establish an ongoing relationship between the parties and ensure that the company respects the 
same standards in all the countries where it operates’.
130
 These agreements reflect the commitment 
of companies towards respect of labor principles, in particular the core labor standards, in all 
countries in which they operate, irrespective of national legislation (which may be very restrictive or 
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 The term transnational company agreement is used within the context of the European Union and their 
scope is therefore limited, see COM(2008) 2155, 2 July 2008, Commission Staff Working Document, ‘The role of 
transnational company agreements in the context of increasing international integration’. An analysis of TCAs is 
provided by: European Commission – Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities DG, Mapping 
transnational texts negotiated at corporate level, 2 July 2008. For more information, see the webpage of the 
European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusions on Employee Involvement: 
<ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=707&langId=en&intPageId=214>. 
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 Dominique Michel, ILO Team Leader of the ILO’s Multinational Enterprises Program, at 
<www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-media-centre/news/WCMS_080723/lang--en/index.htm>. See 
also <www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/Labour/Global_Framework_Agreements.html>. See also 
<baseswiki.org/en/International_Framework_Agreements>; C. Rees, Grievance Mechanisms for Business and 
Human Rights: Strengths, Weaknesses and Gaps, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 
40, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2008, pp. 10, 19-20, 28; and C. 
Rees, D. Vermijs, Mapping Grievance Mechanisms in the Business and Human Rights Arena, Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiative Report No. 28, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
MA, 2008, p. 92.  
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very liberal).
131
 These agreements do not substitute for labor negotiations between companies and 
workers at the national level, however. 
Most GFAs provide for implementation, dissemination monitoring and informing all subsidiaries and 
suppliers. In case a subsidiary or supplier does not respect the terms of the GFA, the multinational 
enterprises’ headquarters may be involved to look for a solution through dialogue.
132
 
The global union federations which have entered into such agreements are the Building and 
Woodworkers’ International (BWI), the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and 
General Workers' Unions (ICEM), Public Services International (PSI), the International Metalworkers' 
Federation (IMF), UNI Global Union (UNI), and the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, 
Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF). An overview of existing GFAs or 
IFAs is provided by the Council of Global Unions (CGU), which was established in 2007 and of which 
almost all global union federations have become members.
133
 A database with all TCAs is provided by 
the European Commission.
134
 
Some of these GFAs / IFAs provide for basic dispute resolution clauses in relation to the 
interpretation or implementation of the agreement. The IFA between Royal Volker Wessels Steven 
NV and the BWI, for example, provides in one of its final clauses that ‘[s]ignatories agree that any 
difference arising from the interpretation or implementation of this agreement will be examined 
jointly, for the purpose of making recommendations to the signatory concerned.’
135
 
Similar provisions can be found in the UNI-Telefónica Code of Conduct (penultimate section);
136
 and 
the Worldwide agreement on fundamental labour rights within the France Telecom Group (Article 
4).
137
 The GFA between GDF Suez and various global unions goes further since it specifically provides 
for mediation between the signatories (in last resort when a complaint from a worker cannot be 
solved otherwise)
138
 in Article 5.1(e) and general joint examination in case of disagreement (Article 
5.2).
139
 And the IFA between AB Electrolux and global unions provides that the right to initiate 
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Responsibility Initiative Report No. 28, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
MA, 2008, pp. 92-93. 
139
 Global Framework Agreement on Fundamental Rights, Social Dialogue, and Sustainable Development, GDF 
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discussions in case of incidents may involve involvement of ‘external expertise’ (penultimate 
paragraph).
140
 
Considering the high-level nature of these agreements, their scope (sometimes involving supply 
chains), and the parties involved, the above-mentioned GFAs generally prescribe the parties to find a 
common and mutually acceptable solution. It appears that any grievances related to working 
conditions at the local level will only be discussed at the GFA-party level in last resort.
141
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3. Summary and recommendations 
3.1 Summary 
The role of business enterprises in the international legal order and the concept of corporate social 
responsibility are currently interpreted by reference to the Framework and complementary Guiding 
Principles of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General presented to the Human Rights 
Council in 2008 and 2011. This Framework consists of three pillars: (1) a duty of states to protect 
human rights; (2) a responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights; and (3) access to 
remedies for those affected by human rights violations. 
The normative framework for states and business enterprises includes – as a minimum – the four 
core labor standards as identified by the ILO in 1998 in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work: 
a. The freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
b. The elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; 
c. The effective abolition of child labor; and 
d. The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
Any business enterprise would need to observe these four core labor standards, which also qualify as 
fundamental human rights, and can be held accountable for noncompliance with these standards. 
This general responsibility is confirmed by, among other instruments, the ILO Tripartite Declaration, 
the OECD Guidelines and the IFC Performance Standards. 
According to the Special Representative, states, business enterprises, and stakeholders have the 
responsibility to provide for access to remedies for those affected by human rights violations. 
Business enterprises and stakeholders have observed this responsibility in various ways. Chapter 2 
provides an overview of existing non-judicial and non-governmental grievance mechanisms for labor-
related disputes. 
First, a number of NGOs currently provide for grievance mechanisms in order to supplement their 
monitoring and verification capabilities with respect to their respective codes of conduct (labor-only 
as well as labor-inclusive). These grievance mechanisms are accessible for workers and/or interested 
parties if their grievances relate to business enterprises who have committed to these NGOs and 
their respective labor standards. Eight grievance mechanisms with an exclusive focus on labor 
disputes were discussed in chapter 2.2. These are the grievance mechanisms provided by SAI/SAAS, 
ETI, BSCI, FLA, FWF, WRC, CCC and ICTI. Further the grievance mechanisms provided for within the 
framework of Utz certified and RFA and which focus on social/labor standards in addition to 
environmental standards were discussed in chapter 2.3. 
Second, business enterprises and stakeholders have agreed to a number of grievance mechanisms 
within the framework of ad hoc agreements, such as company – community grievances and company 
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– trade union agreements. One example of a grievance mechanism within the context of a company-
community agreement was discussed in chapter 2.4, namely the responsibility of the CRC under the 
GMoU between Chevron and local Nigerian communities. Five examples of grievance mechanisms 
within the context of company – trade union agreements (GFAs/IFAs/TCAs) were discussed in the 
same section, involving Royal Volker Wessels Steven, Telefónica, France Telecom Group, GDF Suez, 
AB Electrolux). 
The NGO based grievance mechanisms – whether labor-only or labor-inclusive – included in the 
overview above, vary in scope, sector, access (complainant and complaint), character and form of 
dispute resolution. 
• All grievance mechanisms appear to be focused on labor-intensive industries. Some 
grievance mechanisms are exclusively focused on the textile industry (FLA, FWF, WRC and 
CCC); others are not limited to a specific industry although they are often used within the 
framework of the textile industry. The labor-inclusive mechanisms are focused on the 
agriculture/forestry sector. 
• Apart from CCC, the formal scope of all grievance mechanisms is limited to companies who 
have committed to these NGOs by means of membership or affiliation/participation (BSCI, 
ETI, FLA, FWF, and WRC) or certification (SAI/SAAS, Utz Certified, and RFA). Their 
responsibility generally extends to their supply chains. 
• Apart from the ‘Urgent Appeals System used by CCC, the material scope of all grievance 
mechanisms is limited to the codes of conduct which have been established within the 
framework of the NGOs involved. WRC requires its affiliates to set up codes of conduct on 
the basis of the WRC Model Code. 
• All but ETI, BSCI and ICTI allow interested parties / organizations / stakeholders to submit 
complaints. ETI only allows inter-member complaints, although NGOs and trade unions are 
among ETI’s members. BSCI and ICTI only allow worker complaints, limited to workers in 
China and India (BSCI) and China (ICTI). 
• All but FLA require mere (alleged) noncompliance with the prescribed labor standards. Only 
FLA requires the existence of a significant and/or persistent pattern or noncompliance or a 
serious incident of noncompliance. 
• The degree of procedural detail and level of formalization of the procedure varies from no 
detail and informal (CCC) to highly detailed and very formal (SAI/SAAS, FLA and FWF) with 
multiple layers and intended as a means of last resort (SAI/SAAS FLA and FWF). 
• Finally, most grievance mechanisms have in common that their method of dispute resolution 
is primarily inquiry resulting in a remediation plan which sometimes requires the assistance 
of a third party. 
The individual grievance mechanisms provided for in ad hoc agreements between companies and 
communities and companies and trade unions appear to have in common that they strive for high-
level solutions for individual or systemic problems. The Chevron GMoU provides for access for 
signatories to the GMoU or interested parties to a multi-stakeholder conflict resolution body in last 
resort. The GFAs generally prescribe negotiations, sometimes with the help of a third party, in case of 
a dispute between one of the signatories (likely instigated by the relevant international trade union) 
37 
 
in relation to the implementation of the GFA (likely at the level of one of the company’s subsidiaries 
or suppliers). 
An overview of the differences and similarities between the various grievance mechanisms has been 
included in the table below. 
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TABLE 
 Sector Formal scope Material scope Complainant Complaint Character Conflict resolution and third-
party involvement 
SAI/SAAS General SA8000 certified 
companies; supply 
chain 
SA8000 standard Any interested 
organization or 
person 
Performance of certified 
facilities in view of 
SA8000 standard. 
Detailed and 
formalized 
Local inquiry. Then complaint to 
certification body and appeal to 
SAAS. 
ETI General ETI members; 
supply chain 
Base Code ETI members 
(formally) 
Noncompliance Base 
Code 
Detailed but 
relatively 
informal 
Negotiations and inquiry, 
including specialist third parties, 
such as mediators. 
BSCI General BSCI participants; 
supply chain 
BSCI Code of 
Conduct 
Local workers in 
China and India 
Noncompliance BSCI Code 
of Conduct 
Not detailed; 
informal 
BSCI contacts in China and India 
decide if inquiry involving BSCI 
auditor and BSCI member is 
required. 
FLA Textile FLA members; 
supply chain 
Workplace Code 
or Monitoring 
Principles 
Any interested 
person or 
organization 
Significant and/or 
persistent pattern or 
serious incident of 
noncompliance with 
Workplace Code or 
Monitoring Principles 
Detailed and 
formalized 
Inquiry by FLA involving FLA 
member involved and possibly 
external experts, such as a (local) 
mediator. 
FWF Textile 
 
FWF members; 
supply chain 
FWF Code of 
Labor Practices 
Any interested 
person or 
organization 
Individual or collective 
complaints in relation to 
noncompliance with FWF 
Code of Labor Practices 
Detailed and 
formalized 
FWF or local contact will decide in 
inquiry involving all relevant 
parties, including external parties, 
such as mediators. 
WRC Textile WRC members / 
affiliates; supply 
chain 
Labor standards 
modeled on WRC 
Model Code of 
Conduct 
Any interested 
person (worker) 
or organization 
Noncompliance with labor 
standards modeled on 
WRC Model Code of 
Conduct 
Not detailed; not 
formalized 
Inquiry by WRC which may include 
external parties to mediate 
between parties involved. 
CCC Textile Unlimited; supply 
chain 
CCC Code of 
Labour Practices 
or good labor 
standards 
Any interested 
person (worker) 
or organization 
Noncompliance with the 
CCC Code of Labour 
Practices and general 
noncompliance with good 
labor standards (Urgent 
Appeals System) 
Not detailed; not 
formalized; 
activist 
Inquiry by the CCC Foundation or 
public (or private) solidarity action 
by the CCC and the local CCC 
appeal coordinator in consultation 
with local workers and their 
representatives which may involve 
third parties (Urgent Appeals 
System) 
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ICTI Toys ICTI members; 
supply chain 
ICTI’s Code of 
Business Practice 
Workers in China Likely noncompliance 
with ICTI’s Code of 
Business Practice 
Not detailed; not 
formalized 
It appears that any complaints 
received by local NGO (hotline) / 
ICTI CARE Foundation are dealt 
with within the audit and 
certification processes. 
UTZ 
Certified 
Agriculture UTZ certified 
companies; supply 
chain (involving 
producers, traders, 
roasters and 
others) 
UTZ Certified 
regulations and 
requirements 
Any interested 
person or 
organization 
Noncompliance with the 
terms or spirit of UTZ 
Certified regulations and 
requirements by UTZ 
Certified companies 
Detailed; not 
formalized 
UTZ Certified strives for a solution 
which is acceptable to all parties 
involved. This appears to require 
inquiry involving the respondent. 
A third party may be involved 
when the objectivity of UTZ 
Certified is at stake. 
Rain 
Forest 
Alliance 
Agriculture 
/ forestry 
RFA certified 
companies; supply 
chain 
SAN standards or 
certification 
decision 
Any interested 
person or 
organization / 
relevant 
stakeholders 
Noncompliance with SAN 
standards or certification 
decision 
Not detailed 
(agriculture); 
detailed and 
formalized 
(forestry) 
Likely inquiry by SFC (certification 
body). Inquiry by SmartWood 
(certification program for forestry) 
involving relevant parties, and 
third parties if complainant is not 
satisfied with the outcome of the 
inquiry. 
GMoU 
(Chevron) 
General - 
extractive 
Signatories; (sub) - 
contractors 
GMoU Signatory / 
interested party 
Implementation GMoU Detailed and 
relatively 
formalized 
Multi-stakeholder Conflict 
Resolution Committee will 
attempt to resolve the conflict if 
internal grievance procedure is 
unsuccessful. 
GFA General Signatories; MNE 
group members / 
subsidiaries and 
often suppliers 
GFA Signatory Implementation GFA Not detailed and 
generally not 
formalized 
Negotiation between the 
signatories sometimes involving a 
third party, such as a mediator; 
high-level; last resort. 
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3.2 Recommendations 
If the CSR Conflict Management Center chooses to facilitate dispute resolution in relation to labor 
disputes relating to CSR, the following should be considered. 
It is to be recommended that the CSR Conflict Management Center partners with the existing NGOs 
and bodies which currently provide for labor-related grievance mechanisms, including an umbrella 
organization such as ISEAL Alliance.
142
 These partnerships should include the NGOs referred to in 
chapter 2 and gradually extend to all existing NGOs and institutions in the area of labor standards. 
Such partnership will create a network – possibly with the CSR Conflict Management Center in the 
middle – with the following benefits for all parties involved: 
• Clarification of the number of players in this particular field. 
• Clarification of the number of business enterprises which have committed to grievance 
mechanisms and identify the business enterprises which have not (yet) committed to any 
institutionalized grievance mechanism. 
• Facilitation of the exchange of know-how.
143
 
• Facilitation of efficient deployment and use of (local) staff and networks. 
Such network may particularly benefit the CSR Conflict Management Center: 
• The CSR Conflict Management Center will start from scratch (staff, know-how, network). 
• If the CSR Conflict Management Center will act as a first portal for aggrieved parties, it may 
then be able to direct these parties to the appropriate institutions. Such direction or 
forwarding may occur on the basis of prior commitment of the business enterprise involved 
or, if possible, on the basis of ad hoc commitment of the business enterprise involved. 
• If no institution is available, the CSR Conflict Management Center may then suggest the use 
of a third-party expert to facilitate dialogue – by means of mediation – in order to find a 
mutually acceptable solution. A list of third-party experts or mediators may be assembled 
with the help of the existing NGOs and bodies which currently provide for labor-related 
grievance mechanisms and with whom the CSR Conflict Management Center should 
partner.
144
 The experience of these NGOs in this area and their likely experience with the use 
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of third-party experts (as indicated above) will be invaluable. Such third-party experts may 
also be involved by international trade unions and business enterprises in case of a dispute 
on the interpretation or implementation of a GFA.
145
 
In order to develop its own know-how, as well as the know-how of its partners and possibly the third-
party experts/mediators, it is recommended that the CSR Conflict Management Center cooperates 
with a number of governmental and non-governmental institutions with particular knowledge of 
international labor law. These institutions include: 
• The ILO Helpdesk and the ILO International Institute for Labor Studies for training. 
• National Human Rights Institutes, such as the Danish Human Rights institute / CSR section
146
 
and the recently established Netherlands Human Rights Institute.
147
 
• International and national trade unions through the International Trade Union Confederation 
and the Council and Global Unions.
148
 The involvement of (international) trade unions may 
be of particular importance in order to make sure that CSR Conflict Management Center staff 
members, partners, and affiliated third-party experts/mediators are aware of the activities of 
trade unions worldwide and the importance of collective solutions for labor conflicts. 
In order to develop and improve general dispute resolution skills of third-party experts, it is 
recommended that the CSR Conflict Management Center cooperates with established institutions 
and people with experience in the field, and with knowledge of local customs. These include: 
• The Amsterdam ADR Institute.
149
 
• The International Mediation Institute.
150
 
• The recently established Company/Community Dialogue Facilitators Forum (CCDFF). 
• The Africa Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility.
151
 
• The Consensus Building Institute.
152
 
• Shift, a recently established independent, non-profit center for business and human rights 
practice.
153
 
• Kreddha International.
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